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efficient drill or no-drill decision
making: What the exploration
business can learn from high-
stakes poker
Frank J. Peel
ABSTRACT
A decision to proceed with risk ventures, such as exploration
wells, requires three basic estimates: the cost, if the venture fails;
the reward, if the venture succeeds; and the chance of success
(risk). These three estimates are combined to derive the ex-
pected value and expected rate of return, which are critical to
decisions to proceed or not to proceed with the risk venture.
However, although cost and reward are seen as relatively “hard”
numbers, based on measurable quantities and established price
forecasts, risk is commonly seen as a “soft” number, an opinion
based on incomplete knowledge. Decisions may be deferred,
seeking more constraint on the risk estimate; this delay can be
counterproductive. An alternative approach is used by pro-
fessional poker players to make an equivalent decision. In that
business, too, the chance ofwinning is harder to constrain than the
cost and reward. Instead of seeking to fine-tune the risk, players
compare a rough estimate of chance with “pot odds,” an easily
calculated number (the chance of winning needed to break
even), and use this comparison to make the right decision
efficiently.
This approach can also be used in the exploration business.
Pot odds of a prospect can be calculated using expected dry hole
costs and the predicted value of a discovery. Comparison with
the estimated chance of success may indicate whether we al-
ready have enough information to make the appropriate
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decision or whether further work is justified. This
may improve business decision-making efficiency
or provide a sense check on decisions already made.
INTRODUCTION
The fundamental principles of decision making in
the petroleum industry are well established (e.g.,
Matheson and Howard, 1968; Bickel and Bratvold,
2008; Bratvold and Begg, 2010; Begg et al., 2014).
Three conditions test whether the decision to
drill a prospect is appropriate:
1. Rationality: the decision is based on rational analysis
of all the available information; others would make
the same decision given the same data.
2. Value: the expected value of the opportunity is
sufficiently positive.
3. No regrets: it is not likely that we would make
a different decision based on new information that
could be acquired prior to drilling.
This paper describes a method that may improve
the efficiency of the value test by directing the focus
of activity away from refining the estimates of the
chance of success and expected value and toward a
consideration of a threshold risk value for the op-
portunity (analogous to the “pot odds” concept used
in card games). The method of Peel and Brooks
(2015) is developed tomake a rational estimate of the
chance of regret.
These approaches may make decision making
more efficient. In some cases, they could identify
where there is already sufficient information to
proceed without investing further expense, time, and
effort in the refinement of predrill analyses.
The business of petroleum exploration, like
the business of professional poker, is a game of risk
played for high stakes. Rose (2001) and others have
noted that if the expected commercial value (EV) of
an at-risk exploration opportunity is positive, par-
ticipation in that opportunity is an investment, not
a gamble. We expect to come out ahead if we make
many similar choices. Samuelson (1963) showed that
it makes sense to participate in a single at-risk op-
portunity if the EV is suitable, even if it is not part
of the suite of opportunities. Companies that make
money over the long termdo so because they have fit-
for-purpose estimates of risk, reward, and cost,
coupled with the ability to make the right decisions
in a timely manner. Fit for purpose, in this context,
means that the estimates of risk, reward, and cost
are sufficiently robust to form the basis of a valid
decision; further effort might improve their pre-
cision or their accuracy, but that refinement is
unlikely to invalidate or change the decision.
All relevant terms and abbreviations used
here are defined in the Appendix. Terminology
is consistent with companion articles (Peel and
Brooks, 2015, 2016; Peel and White, 2015). As in
those articles, to avoid potential confusion, the term
“chance of success” and the abbreviation Pg are used
to signify the quantitative estimate of the chance of
geological success of a prospect (see the Appendix
for clarification), whereas the word “risk” is used in
an informal, qualitative sense.
The basic equation for EV, from Rose (2001), is
EV = ðchance of success · expected value of successÞ
-ðchance of failure · expected value of failureÞ
If we take the chance of geological success (Pg) as
our success criterion, this can be written
EV = ðPg · expected reward of geological successÞ
-ð½1- Pg · expected cost of geological failureÞ
Two different classes of exploration oppor-
tunity can be considered (see Table 1 for examples
of each):
Type1: the terms are not fixed.The cost of failure, the
reward of success, or both can be selected. The
decision is in two parts (choosing to participate and
selecting a bid level). A commonly encountered
type 1 decision is an opportunity to farm in to the
drilling of a prospect, awarded to the company
bidding the highest promote level (see the Ap-
pendix). For a type 1 decision, the optimum bid
level is based on estimates of cost, reward, and
chance of success. Reduction in EV is balanced
against an increase in the chance of winning the bid
(see, for example, Johnston, 2003). For this class of
decision, there is value in fine-tuning the estimated
chance of success. Although type 1 decisions are
important, the pot odds concept is not readily
applied to them, so they are not the focus of this
article.
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Type 2: the terms are fixed. The decision is solely
whether to participate or not, because no part of
the expected value is negotiable. A commonly
encountered type 2 decision is whether to drill a
prospect that is already licensed.
Current estimates of cost, reward, and chance of
success are used to calculate the EV of the oppor-
tunity. A decision to proceed can be made on the
basis that EV is positive, with a sufficient expected
rate of return. Value is added by making the ap-
propriate choice, but once there is sufficient in-
formation available to make that determination, little
value is added by further refining the estimated
chance of success.
However, the estimate of the chance of success is
seen as a “soft” number, an opinion based on in-
complete data (Binns and Corbett, 2012), subject to
cognitive bias (Baddeley et al., 2004). Furthermore,
in most cases, chance of success is the factor to which
EV is most sensitive. As a result, exploration com-
panies may expend undue time and effort refining
the estimate of chance of success beyond the point
at which an appropriate decision could be made.
It is instructive to compare type 2 decision
making in petroleum exploration with similar deci-
sions made in card games, in which the player’s
choice is based on the reward of winning (a known
quantity), the cost of playing (also known), and
an estimate of the chance of success (commonly
uncertain and difficult to calculate). Duke and Dia-
mond (2005) describe an efficient strategy used by
some professional poker players. Instead of focusing
on the EVof the opportunity, which requires an exact
estimation of the chance of success, they calculate
what the chance of success would have to be to
break even (the pot odds). They compare this with a
rough estimate of the actual chance of winning, ob-
tained frompast experience and simple rules of thumb.
Tomake the right decision, it is necessary to know only
whether the actual chance of success is greater than the
pot odds. For this purpose, an imprecise estimate of the
chance of success may suffice. The pot odds method
enables an appropriate decision to be made in a short
time, without unnecessary refinement of the estimates.
This paper explores ways in which a similar
approach might be used in petroleum exploration,
with potential improvement in decision-making ef-
ficiency and confidence.
HARD VERSUS SOFT NUMBERS
The cost and reward parts of the EV equation are
perceived as comparatively “hard” numbers, based
on subsurface geophysical mapping, engineering
designs, historical well costs, rig rates, and other
quantitative measures. In contrast, the chance of
success estimate may be seen as a comparatively
soft number, because it is an opinion, not a mea-
surable quantity. It is based on incomplete, im-
perfect data and subject to cognitive bias (e.g.,
Baddeley et al., 2004). Begg et al. (2014) noted that
both the definition of prospect risk and its assigned
probability, Pg, are personal, and they classify it as a
state of mind as opposed to a state of things. There-
fore, Pg is a subjective probability (e.g., Kahneman
Table 1. Examples of Type 1 and Type 2 Decisions in Petroleum Exploration
Decision Type Example(s)
Type 1a: adjustable cost of failure Competitive bidding of cash price for an exploration lease; farm
in with biddable promote level
Type 1b: adjustable reward of success Production sharing contract on undrilled prospects with biddable
split factor*
Type 2: fixed terms, with nonoptional cost and reward Decision to drill an already-licensed prospect†,‡; licensing a
block with drilling commitment to defined prospects; farm
in on fixed terms
*Johnston (2003).
†Capen et al. (1971).
‡Lohrenz (1987).
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and Tversky, 1972; Binns and Corbett, 2012), not an
objective quantity.
This perception is compounded by the knowledge
that, for cost and reward, there is an actual right
answer that will become known if the well is drilled.
The actual cost of drilling will be spent, and the value
of the discovery will become known in the event of
success. In contrast, there is no demonstrable right
answer for the chance of success, which is an opinion
based on the current understanding. With perfect
and complete knowledge, it would have a value of
1 or 0. It has an intermediate value only because
that information is not known. The results of drilling
do not reveal what the appropriate predrill estimate
of Pg should have been. Instead, they reveal what the
subsurface reality is.
It is, therefore, natural that decision makers
may feel uncomfortable investing in an exploration
well (whichmay cost hundreds ofmillions of dollars)
based on a soft number, the estimate of chance of
success. In consequence, they may seek further
clarification and refinement of that estimate before
making the decision. But making the choice to defer
a final decision can effectively be an unintentional
choice not to drill, an example of “paralysis by
analysis” (Langley, 1995), because many oppor-
tunities have limited lifespans, governed by factors
such as lease expiry.
SENSITIVITY OF EXPECTED COMMERCIAL
VALUE TO RISK, REWARD, AND COST: WHY
RISK CAN BE THE DOMINANT FACTOR
The EV depends on three variables (the chance
of success, the expected cost of failure, and the ex-
pected reward of success), but it is typically more
sensitive to variation in the chance of success than it
is to variation in cost and reward (Figure 1). This
suggests that at least as much attention should be paid
to estimating the chance of success as is put into
estimating the expected cost and reward.
Although the tornado plot shown in Figure 1 is
a useful comparison of the effect of the same error
margins applied to cost, reward, and chance of
success, this does not imply that the error margins
for the three variables are equivalent.
Error Margin of Cost of Failure
Probabilistic forward models of well costs (e.g.,
Akins et al., 2005; Hariharan et al., 2006; Kullawan,
2012) tend to indicate well cost error ranges of
–20%–40%. The author’s experience indicates that
the error range should be somewhat greater, but
the data to constrain this are not publicly available.
Error Margin of Reward of Success
Typical error ranges on estimates of the value of
success are wider. Pn is the value for which we
consider there to be n% chance of a success case
outcome exceeding, so that there is a 90% chance
that the success case outcome exceeds the P90
value, and a 10% chance that the success case
outcome exceeds the P10 value; the P90 to P10
range is a measure of the error range for the success
case value. Binns and Corbett (2012), combining
probabilistic predrill volume estimates for 30 pros-
pects, show a distribution for which the P10 is ap-
proximately four times the P90, indicating that the
error margin is a factor of 2.
The error margin of the risk estimate is a difficult
concept to define, and it is still more difficult to
quantify. A possible definition is that the error rep-
resents the possible difference between what Pg is
currently estimated to be and what it might be in the
future after all reasonable predrill technical work has
been completed.
Figure 1. Tornado plot showing the change in the expected
value (EV) of an opportunity from factors of division/multi-
plication, with a base case EV of +$120 million (MM) and base
case values of cost of failure = $100 million, reward of success =
$1000 million, and chance of success = 0.2. Tornado bars show
the effects of multiplying (or dividing) the base case values by
factors of 1.1, 1.5, 2, and 2.5.
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The future Pg estimate may be increased, be
decreased, or remain the same, but the mean of all
these possible future states is equivalent to the
prior estimate (Peel and Brooks, 2015; Peel and
White, 2015).
The method set out in this paper to a specific
prospect requires an estimate of the error margin
of Pg for that prospect. This can be estimated by
considering the maximum reasonable positive or
negative impact on Pg that could result from all the
new data that will be acquired and all the technical
analysis that may be completed prior to drilling.
The author has personal experience risking hun-
dreds of prospects in an explorationportfolio,withmany
of these being reviewed and rerisked several times as
technical work continued and new data were acquired.
This experience indicates that a prospect with a prior Pg
of 0.25might, typically, move down to 0.2 or up to 0.3,
but larger moves are less common, indicating that the
typical error margin is a factor of –20%. The error
margin may also be judged by comparing the current
estimates obtained by different people, different
teams, or different companies. Typically these fall
within the same range, but on rare occasions much
higher differences between companies have been
known (E. Cazier, 2015, personal communication).
Alternatively, if the Pg estimate was obtained by ag-
gregation (Surowiecki, 2004), with peer review
leading to a voting process, the range of individual
votes might be used as a simple means of estimating
the error range of Pg.
THE CONCEPT OF POT ODDS AND ITS
APPLICATION TO DECISION MAKING IN
PETROLEUM EXPLORATION
Many methods can be used to estimate Pg
(e.g., Megill, 1977; Rose, 1987, 1992, 2001; White,
1993; Duff and Hall, 1996; Peel and Brooks, 2016),
and it is not the purpose of this paper to discuss these
methods. However, fine-tuning an existing esti-
mate of Pg may not be a useful contribution to the
decision-making process, and it may even be a dis-
traction from the real business at hand,which is tomake
a decision to drill or not to drill. While a group of
geoscientists may be able to argue at length as to
whether the precise estimate of the Pg of a prospect
should be 0.25 or 0.30, the same group should be
able to reach a rapid consensus that Pg is significantly
better than 0.15, and this call may be sufficient to
make the key decision. Instead of fine-tuning an
estimate of the actual chance of success, it may be
simpler to calculate what Pg would have to be to
achieve a break-even EV, or it may be simpler to
achieve a desired rate of return and then judge
whether the Pg of the prospect in question exceeds
this value.
As noted by Rose (2001), there are parallels
between exploration well decisions and games of risk
such as poker. In both cases, we have an estimate of
the potential reward (the mean success case value or
the size of the pot), an estimate of the cost of playing
(the dry hole cost or the size of the required bet), and
the experience that allows us to estimate the chance of
success. It is easy to see the size of the prize and the cost
of failure, but it is difficult to calculate the estimated
chance of winning.
Although it may be difficult to calculate the
chance of success of a hand of cards, Duke and Di-
amond (2005) show that an approximate estimate
may suffice. It is more important, and much more
straightforward, to calculate the odds that would be
necessary to break even, given the known size of the
pot and the known cost of playing. This critical
threshold level, known as pot odds, is readily calcu-
lated as c / (r + c), where c is the net go-forward cost of
failing, and r is the net go-forward reward of winning.
If the current rough estimate of the chance of success
is clearly better than the pot odds, the player can
make a simple and effective decision to proceed
(or vice versa) and have good confidence that the
decision is appropriate.
The correct decision can be made rapidly without
having to fine-tune an estimate of the chance of
winning.
The same approach can be readily applied to
petroleum exploration.We can easily calculate Pgpot,
the pot odds of an exploration opportunity. Just as in
the poker game, these are the odds that would allow
us to break even (i.e., the Pg that would give EV = 0).
EV = 0 =

Pgpot
ðrÞ - 1 - Pgpot
ðcÞ
Pgpot = c=ðr + cÞ
where c = dry hole cost, and r = reward of success case.
In business, it is not sufficient just to break even.
A good exploration opportunity should give an
expected rate of return that justifies participation.
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The odds required to deliver a desired minimum rate
of return (RoR) are
odds to achieve desiredRoR = cð1 + RoRÞ=ðr + cÞ
For the example used in Figure 1, the base case
values are c = $100 million and r = $1000 million,
giving pot odds = Pgpot = 0.09. To achieve aminimum
rate of return of 25%, the threshold Pg is 0.11.
It is very straightforward to estimate the pot odds
and the odds needed to achieve a desired rate of
return for drilling a prospect. This process provides,
at the very least, a useful sense check. It may enable
us to streamline the decision-making process, by
changing it from one of iteration to precision
(Matheson and Howard, 1968; Bickel and Bratvold,
2008), as shown in Figure 2A, to a very much ab-
breviated, and potentially more efficient, process
shown in Figure 2B.
This is illustrated by a notional prospect forwhich
there are good estimates of $100 million for the mean
dry hole cost and +$250 million for the mean success
case value and an initial estimate of Pg = 0.4 for the
chance of success.Using these numbers, the EVof the
opportunity has a positive value (+$40 million), in-
dicating that the right decision is probably to drill.
However, EV calculation alone does not give a
sense of how robust such a decision to drill would be.
The decisionmight be deferred so thatmore time and
effort could be spent refining the estimated chance of
success, following the loop shown in Figure 2A.
A complementary approach, which casts light on
whether seeking further risk refinement is worth-
while, is to calculate the pot odds for this oppor-
tunity.Given the same numbers for cost and reward,
it is readily determined that the opportunity would
break even with Pgpot = 100/(100 + 250) = 0.286 and
that the Pg required to give an expected rate of
return of 25% is (100 + 25)/(100 + 250) = 0.36.
Calculating these values should be a trivial matter
requiring no extrawork, because the dry hole cost and
the reward of success should already have been es-
timated as part of the conventional decision process.
For this example, the team considers that a
reasonable predrill work program could change the
estimate of Pg up to 0.45 or down to 0.35, so the
likely error range of Pg is –0.05.
A simple comparison of this error range with the
pot odds (Figure 3) demonstrates that the prospect is
quite robust as currently evaluated. It has a positive
expected value, and new work or new data are un-
likely to change that status. It is likely to give an
expected rate of return above 25%.
In this case, we could make a decision to proceed
with some confidence and with no requirement for
further work. This does not mean that work should
necessarily be halted; there is always some transfer-
rable value to be gained from any new learning, but in
a resource-constrained organization it may be more
efficient to redirect effort to other opportunities
where it can add more value.
Figure 2. (A) Standard decision
analysis cycle (after Matheson
and Howard, 1968; Bickel and
Bratvold, 2008). (B) Pot odds
approach, which may enable
more efficient decision making.
EV = expected commercial value;
n = no; Pg = chance of geological
success; RoR = rate of return; y =
yes.
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The power of this approach in differentiating
between opportunities is illustrated by Figure 4,
where three different prospects are shown to have
different values for the reward of the success case, the
cost of the failure case, and the chance of success.
Each prospect has the same EV (+$40 million), and
each prospect has the same pot odds (0.167). Each
prospect also has the same margin of error for the Pg
estimate (–0.05). The conventional EV approach
alone provides no discrimination between the three
prospects. However, it is clear by observation that
for prospect c, the error bar of Pg does not come close
to the pot odds threshold, and therefore a decision to
proceed can be made without refining the Pg esti-
mate. For the other two prospects (a and b), there is
significant incursion of the error bar into the neg-
ative territory below pot odds, so for these, we may
either choose to initiate further study beforemaking
the decision or to redirect efforts to more promising
opportunities.
CALCULATING THE CHANCE OF REGRET
The third condition for a good decision is that we are
not likely to regret making a commitment to a well
test based on new information that we might acquire
prior to the test. In some circumstances, it is possible
to estimate the chance of regret, which could further
inform the decision.
This may be possible if
• the nature (but not the outcome) of the new
information is known;
• the outcome is binary: either good news (leading
us to upgrade the estimated chance of success)
or bad news (leading us to downgrade it), with
no intermediate outcomes; or
• the revised value of Pg can be predicted for either
outcome.
As shown graphically in Figure 5A, the current
estimate of Pg (prior value, P1) may be downgraded
to P2 by bad news or upgraded to P3 by good news.
If we can estimate these future conditional proba-
bilities, P2 and P3, then we can calculate the like-
lihood of a bad news outcome (x) that is compatible
with them using the law of total probability (see dis-
cussion in Peel and White, 2015; Peel and Brooks,
2015), as follows:
P1 = ðxÞðP2Þ + ð1 - xÞðP3Þ;
hence x = ðP3 - P1Þ ðP3 - P2Þ=
Figure 5B shows a worked example in which a
prospect has a currently estimated Pg of 0.3,
positive EV, and pot odds of 0.2. A drill or drop
decision must be made immediately to retain the
license. Given these positive indications, a decision
to test the prospect has been made. However, the
quality of the hydrocarbon fluid is unknown, and this
could be resolved by obtaining a fluid sample from a
nearby well. If the fluid in the adjacent structure is
found to be highly biodegraded, Pg for the prospect
would reduce to 0.15. In that outcome, the new Pg
would have fallen below the pot odds threshold, and
we would regret the decision to commit to drilling.
Conversely, if the fluid is revealed to be of good
quality, Pg would be raised to 0.35. Applying the
law of total probability indicates that the chance of
the bad outcome, which will cause us to regret the
Figure 3. Comparison of the chance of geological success (Pg)
estimate against the pot odds and the odds required to give 25%
rate of return (RoR).
Figure 4. Comparison of the chance of geological success (Pg)
estimate against the pot odds for three prospects (a, b, and c),
which all have the same expected commercial value. The values
shown are, in order, the mean reward of success, mean cost of
failure, and current estimate of Pg. MM = million.
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decision prior to testing, is approximately 0.25. It is
unlikely that the new information would cause us to
regret a go-ahead decision, and this knowledge may
help to inform the decision-making process.
The chance of regret estimated in this way is
a correct calculation, but it is highly subjective,
because it is obtained by combining three different
subjective probability estimates. Consequently, it
should be used as an indicative guide, not a rule.
Estimating the chance of regret is impractical if
• the new information is not binary, so that instead of
a single good news or bad news outcome, it could
provide a distribution of possible intermediate
outcomes; or
• the impact that the new information could have on
the chance of success cannot be predicted.
CONCLUSIONS
For some decisions, value can be added by refining
the estimate of the Pg. These are the situations where
we not only need to decidewhether to participate, but
also to set a bid level that affects the cost and reward.
However, a common class of decisions, such as the
choice to drill a prospect, only requires us to make
the right choice. Refining the Pg estimate adds no
further value once there is enough information to
make that call.
An estimate of the EV of the opportunity is
commonly made as part of the conventional decision-
making process. The EV calculation requires an esti-
mate of the cost of failure and the reward of success.
Two critical parameters are readily calculated from the
same inputs: pot odds (the Pg that would give an EV of
0) and RoR threshold odds (the Pg that gives a desired
RoR for the ventured cost).
A simple comparison of the currently estimated
Pg against the pot odds and against the RoR threshold
odds may be sufficient to make the decision to drill or
not to drill. If the reasonable error range of Pg is above
the critical threshold limit, it adds no value to further
refine the Pg estimate. It is more important to esti-
mate what the potential error of the Pg estimate
might be than it is to refine the estimate.
Application of this approach requires little
additional work. At the very least, it should be of
value in informing the decision-making process. In
some circumstances, it may enable significant cost
and time savings in the exploration cycle by helping
to identify when there is already enough information
available to make the appropriate decision.
APPENDIX: DEFINITIONS
Farm in: a business deal in which a company earns equity in an
exploration opportunity, typically in return for a cash payment
and/or taking on a share of the cost, commonly at a premium
(promote level).
Promote level: the ratio between the fractional equity
earned and the fraction of the costs to be paid, so that earning
Figure 5. Estimation of the chance of regret based on an
estimate of prior (current) chance of success and estimates of
what that could change to in light of bad news or good news. The
x-axis represents the estimated chance of geological success (Pg);
the y-axis shows the passage of time and the acquisition of new
information. A decision and commitment to proceed has been
made on the basis that the current Pg estimate exceeds the pot
odds threshold. If the new information brings good news, the Pg
estimate increases, and vice versa. We will regret the decision only
if the revised Pg estimate falls below the pot odds threshold (gray
shading). (A) The general case: P1 represents our current (prior)
estimate of the chance of success, Pg, prior to gaining new in-
formation. P2 and P3 represent the possible future values of the Pg
estimate, given that new information is bad news (P2) or good
news (P3); x is the chance of bad news, and (1 - x) is the chance of
good news. (B) Values used in the worked example described in the
text.
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50% equity in exchange for paying 100% costs constitutes a
two-for-one promote.
Geological success of a prospect: the following discussion
is modified from Peel and Brooks (2015). The chance of pros-
pect success is critical to the understanding of prospect
economics (e.g.,Allais, 1956;Newendorp, 1972;Megill, 1977;
Rose, 1987, 2001). However, literature is inconsistent as to
how it should be defined. This definition set out here, which is
widely applied in exploration companies, is consistent with
(and necessary for) modern methods of prospect volume es-
timation using probabilistic tools such as GeoX®.
Every exploration prospect, before it is drilled, should
have a clearly defined geological success case model describing
all its components (for example, the success model for a
prospect could be that it is a four-way closure containing
deepwater turbidite sands deposited in a slope channel, sealed
by a marine shale, and sourced by a defined source rock, etc.).
The geological success case model is a sufficient condition for
the presence of a hydrocarbon accumulation. If all the com-
ponents of the geological success casemodel are true, then the
conditions for hydrocarbon accumulation have been met and
an accumulation exists.
The parameter ranges (e.g., reservoir porosity, closure
height, volume of migrated hydrocarbons, etc.) that the
success case geology could deliver are defined, and these are
used to calculate the range of possible hydrocarbon volumes
that the prospect success case model as a whole could deliver.
These success case volumes can be described by probability
density and exceedance curves (Figure 6).
The outcome is deemed to be a geological success if the
success case geological model, as defined prior to drilling, is a
true description of the subsurface reality. The consequence of
success by this definition is that the discovered volume falls on
the defined success case probability versus volume curve. There
is an n% chance that the success case volume will exceed the
Pn value (e.g., there is a 50% chance, given success, that the
volume exceeds the P50). The minimum success case volume
may be, but is not necessarily, zero. Figure 6 shows an
example where the success case probability–volume curve
does not start at zero.
Success does not necessarily equate to there being enough
reservoired oil or gas to sustain flow (cf., Rose, 2001) nor to the
outcome being commercially developable (although success
may fulfill these conditions).
Exceedance probability and P90-P50-P10 values: many
events give an outcome of unknown magnitude, such as a
discovery well proving the existence of a hydrocarbon accu-
mulation whose size is unknown in advance. It is common
(e.g., Rose, 1987, 2001) to describe the distribution of such
future outcomes using exceedance probability curves, which
plot an outcome value Pn (e.g., the volume of the discovered
field) against the probability n% that the outcomewill be larger
than that value, as shown in Figure 6. Thus, P100 represents a
value we are 100% certain the outcome will exceed (i.e., it is
the minimum volume); P90 represents a value we think there
is a 90% chance the outcomewill exceed; P50 is valuewe think
there is a 50% chance the outcomewill exceed; and so on up to
P0, the maximum value that we think there is zero chance of
the outcome exceeding.
Geological failure of a prospect: the outcome is deemed to
be a geological failure if all or any component part of the
conditions required for the geological success case model are
not true. Some geological failure cases may contain in-place
hydrocarbon volumes (Figure 6C), for example, if instead
of the reservoir model (sandstone) defined as constituting the
success case, the structure contains a different rock with some
porosity (e.g., siltstone, tuff). Some geological failure outcomes
may even have enough reservoired oil or gas to sustain flow.
Chance of geological success: prospect Pg is the current
estimate of the likelihood that the success case geological
model is correct, based on the current available data and state
of understanding.
The Pg is equivalent to the chance of being on the success
case curve of the probability–volume distributions. Because
the statement of the geological success case model should be
intimately linked to the expression of the parameter ranges
that the success case should deliver, the chance of success is
explicitly equivalent to the chance of exceeding the P100
success case hydrocarbon volume; it is also equivalent to twice
the chance of exceeding the P50 success case volume, 10 times
the chance of exceeding the P10, and so on, as shown in
Figure 6B.
The Pg is therefore not equivalent to the chance that
the prospect is commercially developable, that the structure
contains hydrocarbons, or that the hydrocarbons constitute at
Figure 6. (A) Unrisked exceedance curve (black) and probability density function (gray) showing the range of volumes predicted if the
success case model is correct. In the event of geological success, the model is correct. The minimum volume in the success case is the P100;
there is an n%chance that the volumewill exceed the Pn value. (B) Risked curves, showing the absolute chance of exceeding the same volumes.
(C) Risked curves for a prospect for which some of the geological failure cases may contain hydrocarbons. Pg = chance of geological success.
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least a “moveable teacup” (minimum reservoired oil or gas to
sustain flow).
The use of the abbreviation Pg follows the terminology of
Rose (1987, 1992, 2001); other sources use different abbre-
viations, including GP (geological probability), GPoS (geo-
logical probability of success), CoS (chance of success), and
POSg (Ross, 1997, 2004; Quirk and Ruthrauff, 2008).
The term “risk” is also used in some sources to describe the
chance of success (Rose, 1992, 2001; White, 1993), with
potential confusion as to whether it means the chance of the
desirable outcome (Pg) or the chance of the undesirable
outcome (1 - Pg), and with further confusion with the use of
the same word to mean a different concept in financial liter-
ature (see discussion in Peel and Brooks, 2015). Therefore, in
this article, the word risk is used in only a qualitative sense.
Expected value: the mathematical use of “value” means
the magnitude of any quantity (number, mass, distance, etc.),
not necessarily a monetary quantity. In statistics and proba-
bility analysis, the expected value of a discrete random variable
is the probability-weighted average of all possible values. This
quantity is calculated by multiplying each of the possible
outcomes by the likelihood that each outcome will occur and
summing all of those values. In this article we use “expected”
and “expected value” to refer to statistical expectation.
Expected commercial value: the meaning is slightly dif-
ferent in finance and economics, where the word “value” refers
specifically to the commercial worth. Expected commercial
value (ECV) is the statistical expected value of the commercial
worth of a project or opportunity. In petroleum economics
literature, expected commercial value is commonly abbre-
viated to expected value or EV (e.g., Rose, 2001). Because
this leads to potential ambiguity, in this article we specifically
state “EV” when referring to expected commercial value.
EV = ni = 1 PðAiÞ · V jAi
where Ai represents a possible outcome of the project
(there are n possible outcomes, A1 to An); P(Ai) is the prob-
ability of a particular outcome (Ai); and V|Ai is the monetary
value of the same particular outcome (Ai).
If all the outcomes considered successes are amalgamated
based on some defined criterion, estimations can be made for
the chance of success, mi = 1PðAiÞ; for all the m success cases;
the chance of failure; the expected value of success (i.e., the
reward); and the expected value of failure (i.e., the cost).
Given this simplification, the relationship of Rose
(2001, p. 1) is obtained:
EV = ðchance of success · expected value of successÞ
- ðchance of failure · expected value of failureÞ
This relationship applies no matter what criterion is
chosen to define success, as long as the value estimate is
consistent with that criterion. If the criterion is defined as
geological success, then
EV = PgðrewardÞ - ð1 - PgÞðcostÞ
Present value: the value of money held in the future is
different from the value of the same dollar amount held today.
Adjusting the values of future costs and rewards to account for
thepassage of time, using a discount rate, enables calculation of
the equivalent value today (present value).
Expected net present value: the equivalent of EV if the
monetary amounts involved are all converted to PV (ENPV).
Hence, if cost and reward are expressed in present value terms,
ENPV = PgðrewardÞ - ð1 - PgÞðcostÞ
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